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A Container-based Monitoring Approach for
Auditability of Cloud Providers Using Blockchain
Abstract—With the rapid development of cloud-based systems
providing numerous pay-as-you-go and elastic services, we are
increasingly exposed to data leakages and incidents of unautho-
rised access to customers’ personal data. In this context, cloud
customers should be able to choose available services based on
their security and privacy requirements. This paper presents the
design of a container-based monitoring architecture for multi-
cloud ecosystems which produces an audit trail of providers’
operations on customers data in a secure and automatic way. The
architecture makes use of Blockchain technology to automatically
verify compliance with the data protection, data minimisation
and data transfer obligations contemplated in the General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR) by cloud providers’ activities that
are recorded using the monitoring system. We propose three
smart contracts in order to: (i) enable customers to give a
preference for the verification of such GDPR obligations in
their selected services, (ii) store the information captured via the
container using the monitoring system, and (iii) verify compliance
with the GDPR by cloud providers. The smart contracts are
deployed in a Blockchain test network to determine their costs.
Index Terms—Blockchain, Container-based monitoring, Data
privacy, General data protection regulation, Smart contracts.
I. INTRODUCTION
Driven by lower costs of ownership, elastic on-demand
services, enhanced interoperability and the insights derived
from machine learning, cloud computing synthesises the best
of previous mainframe and personal computer paradigms.
Given the manifold benefits of cloud computing, companies
increasingly rely on cloud vendors’ servers and infrastructure
to host and operate their websites and mobile apps. Cloud
platform services are also gradually becoming the preferred
choice for developers to create and deploy middleware and
other customised applications. Similarly, cloud-based applica-
tions, which allow users to run software through web browsers
without the need to install any specific software, are growing
in popularity. As a result, data is migrating to the cloud, a
trend that is unlikely to be halted or reversed in the foreseeable
future [2].
Aside from its undeniable benefits, however, cloud comput-
ing has a negative flipside. The growing amounts of data stored
in the cloud, coupled with the complexity of cloud ecosystems,
raise significant governance and compliance concerns under
the recently introduced EU General Data Protection Regu-
lation (GDPR) [3]. GDPR compliance concerns serve as a
barrier to migration to the cloud, especially for SMEs, which
are more likely to “find it difficult to exercise the full control
required by data protection legislation on how the provider
delivers the requested services” [1].
Cloud-based solutions are typically “layered”, involving a
complex and convoluted chain of cloud service providers. In
this architecture, it can be difficult for the data controller to
effectively check the cloud vendors’ data handling practices
and thus to be certain that the data is being handled in a
lawful manner. In the same vein, due to loss of governance
and control, the cloud customer may be incapable of providing
evidence of compliance with inter alia the data location and
transfer, “privacy-by-design” and accountability requirements
laid down in the GDPR (Arts. 44–47, 25 and 5(2)) [8].
On the other hand, end-users (i.e. “data subjects” in the
GDPR parlance) are seldom aware of the highly intricate and
layered architecture of cloud computing [4]. They typically
interact only with a Web interface rather than the larger,
composite ecosystem, entrusting their personal data and iden-
tity to the consumer-facing component without realising that
the cloud-based application may share their data with several
back-end services (e.g. providers of cloud-hosted analytics and
online advertising). In this opaque context, it is hard for data
subjects to exert any control over their personal data after
the initial disclosure. Also, when multiple subcontractors are
involved in a cloud solution, the risk of personal data being
processed for further, incompatible purposes is quite high. [1]
Crucially, the dearth of transparency that characterises cloud
ecosystems impede the data subject’s ability to give “informed
consent” to the use, sharing, and repurposing of their personal
data. Users experience a lack of control over their personal
data, exacerbated by the growing number of data breaches
resulting from cyberattacks on cloud vendors. This threatens
to undermine consumer trust and hinder the uptake of cloud
computing.
To realise the full potential and benefits of cloud comput-
ing, the data protection concerns above must be effectively
addressed. To this end, cloud ecosystems should be both
transparent and auditable. In particular, data subjects should
be able to verify who processes their personal data, with
whom it is shared, what are the legal bases justifying the
processing, and crucially, whether their consent given for one
or more specific purposes is respected or overridden. In turn,
cloud customers, acting as data controllers, should be able
to check whether their cloud service providers are processing
their users’ personal data in a lawful manner, in accordance
with their instructions, so they can both be sure that their users’
data protection rights are being respected and be able to prove
compliance with the GDPR obligations and requirements to
which they are bound.
Blockchain technology is becoming a promising solution
for enhancing data privacy in cloud environments [5], [7]. It
enables the production of an audit trail of cloud providers
through a fully distributed, provable secure and consensus-
based way [9]. For instance, an automatic way for tracking
and enforcing data sharing agreements between a customer and
cloud providers with the aid of smart contract and Blockchain
was proposed in [10]. In this approach, the violation of the
shared agreements by the providers were detected by a number
of voters listed in a voting contract. Similarly, the integration
of Blockchain and GDPR resulted into the design of a privacy-
aware architecture for cloud ecosystems - promoting access
control - in [11]. Relatedly, in [12], a number of GDPR rules
were translated into smart contracts in order to automatically
verify legal compliance in the operations executed by providers
on cloud customers’ data. Although the foregoing approaches
make use of the GDPR and Blockchain for improving data
privacy, none of them considers the preferences of cloud
customers for verifying GDPR obligations. Moreover, they
did not technically examine how container technology is used
within a privacy-aware cloud architecture in order to monitor
the activities of cloud providers and improve customers trust.
In order to address this, we propose a new container-based
architecture making use of Blockchain and GDPR. The key
contributions of this parer are summarized below:
• an online pharmacy scenario is presented to show GDPR
concerns within cloud composite services;
• a container-based monitoring framework is proposed to
record the operations executed on personal data, which is
exchanged or stored while handling the customer query
for accessing the online pharmacy application hosted in
a multi-cloud environment;
• three smart contracts are proposed to verify the operations
of cloud providers on personal data in the light of three
GDPR obligations (data protection, data minimisation and
data transfer);
• our Blockchain-based solution allow cloud customers to
give their priorities for verifying compliance with the
three GDPR obligations above;
• the proposed smart contracts are deployed in a
Blockchain test network for evaluating their costs and
mining time.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section II
presents the online pharmacy scenario. Section III presents the
design of the container-based architecture and proposes the
smart contracts. Section IV describes experimental results of
our Blockchain-based technique, and finally Section V sets
forth a number of conclusions.
II. AN ONLINE PHARMACY
Imagine a patient who wishes to buy drugs available on
prescription online. The patient visits an online pharmacy to
place the order, make the payment and get his prescription
shipped to his home address. Online transactions like this
seem very simple in the eye of consumers, but there is much
going on behind the curtains. The online pharmacy is actually
a multi-layered cloud-based service involving multiple flows
of personal data from the user to different service providers.
Upon the patient placing the order, the pharmacy accesses
the patient’s personal data, including name, address details,
age, general practitioner (GP) diagnosis, electronic version
of the prescription, and bank account details. Moreover, the
pharmacy maintains an electronic health record (EHR) to store
useful information about the medical status of patients. The
online pharmacy uses a Russia-based IaaS vendor (Cloud4U)
to host and operate its website and mobile app. All the data
above are transferred to Cloud4U’s servers located in Moscow.
The pharmacy’s website and mobile app are embedded with
so-called “social plugins” (a “Like” button and a “Share”
button) from a leading social network (Friendface). The default
implementation of Friendface’s APIs and SKDs is designed
to automatically transmit data from the online pharmacy to
Friendface the moment a user visits the pharmacy’s website
or opens the app. The automatically transmitted data includes
events data (such as “App installed” and “SDK initialised”)
and location data. Friendface uses this data to enrich the
patient’s profile it has built over time (i.e. profiling), which
is valuable for its ad targeting business.
The online pharmacy uses the real-time bidding (RTB)
system of a prominent online advertiser and intermediary
(Froogle) to sell advertising inventory space on its website
and mobile app, and thus derive another revenue stream.
Every time a user visits the pharmacy’s website or uses the
pharmacy’s mobile app, RTB cookies and tracking pixels are
placed on the user’s device, thereby enabling the broadcast
of said user’s personal data to hundreds of companies in
the ad tech chain. The personal data includes the user’s
location, device description, unique tracking ID, IP address,
data broker ID segment, and what the user is currently reading
or watching, among other data. The broadcast of personal data
is made by Froogle’s “Supply Side Platform” on behalf of the
pharmacy, with an aim to solicit bids from companies which
may want to show an ad to the pharmacy’s user.
Lastly, the pharmacy subcontracts payment and shipping
service providers to handle the payment and delivery of
medicines. The payment service provider receives the patient’s
name and bank account details from the pharmacy, offering
two alternatives, Western Union and Paypal, to manage the
payment process. The shipping service provider, in turn,
receives the patient’s name and address details from the
pharmacy, whereupon it packs the order, sends the patient a
reference number to track his parcel, and delivers it.
Each data flow in this cloud-based ecosystem amounts to
a “personal data processing” operation, thus triggering the
application of the GDPR. Within this regulatory framework,
the online pharmacy is the data controller, as it determines
the purposes and means of the personal data processing.
Specifically, it processes the patient’s personal data to process
and complete the order (purpose), and it does so through the
multi-layered architecture explained above (means). Cloud4U
and the payment and shipping providers, conversely, are data
processors, as they process the patient’s personal data on
Fig. 1. A business process model for online pharmacy
behalf of the controller, in furtherance of the purpose the
controller has determined. Friendface and Froogle, in turn,
are joint controllers with the online pharmacy in respect
of the operations involving the collection and disclosure of
the patient’s personal data to the first two companies, and
sole controllers in respect of the operations involving data
processing carried out by them after the patient’s personal data
have been transferred. Determining these roles is an important
preliminary step, as controllers and processors are subject to
different obligations. For example, data protection rights can
be enforced against controllers only.
Although the GDPR subsumes all operations performed on
personal data within the same term (i.e. processing), for the
purposes of our architecture we identify and name three sepa-
rate operations. Firstly, order processing, which encompasses
the provision of personal data by the patient to the pharmacy
upon placing the order, and the disclosure of personal data by
the pharmacy to the payment and shipping providers to process
payment and delivery. Secondly, international transfer, which
refers to the transfer of personal data from the online pharmacy
to actors located outside the EU. Thirdly, online advertising,
which include the collection and processing of personal data
by Friendface and Froogle for the provision of their online
advertising services.
There are many data protection issues concerning the three
operations above. For the sake of simplicity and on account
of space limitations, however, we will focus on the following
three:
• Transfers of personal data to a non-EU country or inter-
national organisation are restricted. There are two main
ways of allowing international transfers of personal data:
on the basis of an adequacy decision by the European
Commission, or in lieu thereof, where the controller
or processor provides appropriate safeguards, including
enforceable rights and legal remedies for the data subject
[8], Art. 45. These appropriate safeguards can be estab-
lished by a legally binding and enforceable instrument
between public authorities or bodies; binding corporate
rules (BCRs); standard data protection clauses adopted
either by the European Commission or by a supervisory
authority; codes of conduct; or certification mechanisms
[8], Arts. 46 and 47.
• The principle of data security requires that appropriate
technical or organisational measures are implemented
when processing personal data to protect the data against
accidental, unauthorised or unlawful access, use, mod-
ification, disclosure, loss, destruction or damage [8],
Arts. 5(1)(f) and 32(1). Depending on the specific cir-
cumstances of each case, these measures may include, for
example, pseudonymising and encrypting personal data.1
• Under the data minimisation principle, the personal data
being processed must be limited to what is necessary [8],
Art. 5(1)(c). Whether the data is necessary will depend
on the controller’s specified purpose for collecting and
using the personal data.
III. ARCHITECTURE
We propose a multi-tier container-based monitoring archi-
tecture as shown in Fig. 2, based on the above online pharmacy
case study. In this architecture, the operations related to the
online pharmacy application are executed inside a container
hosted over multiple cloud service providers (at Infrastructure
as a Service layer).
Fig. 2. Multi-tier Cloud Monitoring Architecture
The proposed architecture consists of three functional levels:
1) service provisioning, 2) monitoring, and 3) blockchain level.
At the service provisioning level, whenever any customer (i.e.
a patient) places an order on the online pharmacy website/app
hosted over the cloud, the data exchange between the customer
and the cloud provider happens in a containerised environ-
ment. The controller2 cloud provider (Cloud4U) receives the
request and distributes the service compositions to different
processor cloud providers (Western Union/Paypal or shipment
provider). Alongside, there may be a possibility of some
automated joint controllers (FriendFace and Froogle) coming
1Given that ’data security’ has in computer science a meaning other than
that contemplated in the GDPR, in this paper we refer to this obligation as
’data protection’, a term which we believe encapsulates better the essence of
this obligation
2Legally speaking, Cloud4U is a processor, but for the purposes of
the architecture, the infrastructure that hosts the controller (i.e. the online
pharmacy) is the controller
into actions due to default SDKs or plugins embedded within
the controller cloud provider’s perimeter. Once the service is
initiated, the monitoring system is activated. The monitoring
system contains two main components, 1) GDPR-Agent, and
2) GDPR-Manager, which is responsible for monitoring the
data operations taking place on the data in question throughout
its lifetime and recording them on the blockchain. At the
blockchain level, the smart contracts are deployed to analyse
potential GDPR violations.
A. Monitoring System
The GDPR-Agent is a monitoring agent which is executed
inside a container to track the data operations in the container-
hosted online services. The GDPR-Agent understands the
underlying heterogeneity of the containers deployed on a
multi-tier cloud infrastructure. The main task of the GDPR-
Agent involves the collection of data operation statistics along
with multi-level statistics and its transmission to the GDPR-
Manager. The GDPR-Manager runs inside the controller cloud
provider, and collects all the data operations monitored by
different GDPR-Agents deployed in the entire service chain.
The working of these components is described below.
1) GDPR-Agent: GDPR-Agent is a software element that
when activated collects the events related to the data operations
being performed inside a container in a cloud-hosted service
(like the online pharmacy). The GDPR-Agent also known as
SmartAgent receive data from various sub agents (like Process
Agent, System Agent, File Agent, User Access Agent, and
Network Agent), which are shown in Fig. 3.
Fig. 3. GDPR-Agent model
There are three operations related to the GDPR-Agent: 1)
a registration request is sent by the agent to the manager, 2)
data related to operations and other statistics are sent by the
agent to the manager periodically, and 3) the agent sends its
configuration information to the manager, which can update
the configuration parameters of the agent if required. Initially,
this agent has to register with the GDPR-Manager according
to the process shown in Fig. 4
2) GDPR-Manager: The GDPR-Manager receives the in-
formation related to the data operations monitored by different
GDPR-Agents (deployed inside containers). The entire com-
Fig. 4. Registration and data collection of GDPR Agent
munication process between GDPR-Agent and the manager is
shown in Fig. 5.
Fig. 5. Communication process
Once the GDPR-Agent is registered with the GDPR-
Manager (step 1), the access key and the endpoints are sent
to the GDPR-Agent by the manager. Thereafter, the Agent
sends the monitored events to the GDPR-Manager through the
Manager Executor (step 2). The GDRP-Manager communi-
cates with the GDPR-Agent using Advanced Message Queuing
Protocol (AMQP). The data operations and statistics (such
as system, network, file, process and user access) collected
from the container are added to multiple queues via AMQP
messages, where they are filtered to extract GDPR-relevant
metrics. The data received from the monitoring agent is
exposed to rule-based queries activated inside a filtering engine
through a query executor. These queries filter out the GDPR-
specific metrics from the overall statistics and data collected
by the GDPR-Agents (step 3). After this, the GDPR-Manager
records the GDPR metrics onto the Ethereum blockchain using
Push-based mechanism (step 4). Finally, the configuration
information is sent to the manager, which can update the
same if required (dynamic configuration enables real-time
communication) (step 5). To submit the GDPR metrics to
the Ethereum blockchain, the GDPR-Manager has to create
a ethereum account and get an ETHER ID. This process is
shown in Fig. 6.
Fig. 6. Registration process of GDPR Manager
3) Monitoring Process: The monitoring process involves
different steps and programming operations as shown in Fig.
7. These steps and related operations are described below.
• All the GDPR-Agents are deployed in the container of the
user and cloud providers; the data operations are recorded
and sent to the GDPR-Manager.
• These events or metrics are added into different queues
based on their type or characteristic via AMQP messages
using a Publish/Subscribe mechanism. For this purpose,
AMQP producers compatible with RabbitMQ were built,
which carry out the publication of the data operations
recorded by the GDPR-Agent. Now, RabbitMQ was
the AMQP server selected to act as a message-broker
between the GDPR-Agent and the GDPR-Manager. For
example, if an agent monitors the transfer operation, then
its AMQP client triggers a connection to the RabbitMQ
server and send the recorded data to the “Process” queue.
• The data sent to the GDPR-Manager is collected through
a manager executor working in the collection engine.
• The data collected at the collection engine is further
passed on to the filtration engine where the query execu-
tor triggers a rule-based query to filter the GDPR metrics.
This is done to avoid the addition of non-GDPR event
in the blockchain. This enhances the efficiency of the
verification process.
• Finally, this data is filtered and added to the blockchain as
a transaction. For this reason, the manager (which already
has an Ethereum account) creates a genesis (i.e. first)
transaction to which data, the timestamp, the signature,
and the public key of the controller cloud provider are
appended, as shown below.
T1 = [Data, T imeStamp, sign, Publickey]
• This is followed by the creation of the genesis block (B)
with a unique ID; B: [BID]
• The genesis transaction (T1) is added to the block (B)
after validation by the trusted nodes.
• The user creates new transactions in the same manner
until the block achieves the maximum block size (fixed)
or threshold (variable).
B : [T1, T2, T3, . . . , Tn]
Fig. 7. Architecture
• Finally, the block is added to the blockchain where the
smart contracts are deployed to verify the data operations
according to GDPR.
B. GDPR-supported smart contracts
Figure 8 represents our proposed smart contracts. Two
smart contracts, namely GDPR-priority and container-log, are
proposed to record the information required for checking
GDPR compliance. verification is deployed to verify com-
pliance with the aforementioned obligations (data protection,
data minimisation and data transfer) by cloud providers. The
activators of GDPR-priority, container-log and verification are
respectively the data subject (user), the smart manager, and the
verifier. Note that verifier is a trusted third party connected to
the Blockchain in charge of flagging GDPR violations.
Fig. 8. GDPR-supported smart contracts
C. Determining GDPR Compliance Preference
Verifying compliance with GDPR obligations (i.e. data
protection, data minimisation and data transfer) is a costly
process. In some cases, a data subject may not be concerned
about the observance of the obligations above, and thus prefer
not to verify compliance therewith and save money. This phase
enables data subjects to activate the GDPR-priority contract
in order to specify their preferences for verifying compliance
with obligations. The smart contract allows the data subject
to give a compliance score, thus signalling his preference in
respect of each obligation.
Definition 1. Let Σ be a set of GDPR obligations. A compli-
ance score is a function S : Σ 7→ [0, 1]. A compliance score
S(σ) = 1 shows a must for the verification of an obligation
σ ∈ Σ and S(σ) = 0 ignores the verification of σ.
The contract stores such scores into a Blockchain to inform
the verifier about the data subject’s preferences concerning the
verification of GDPR obligations. For example, data protection
is likely to be the greatest concern of the customers of
the online pharmacy depicted in Fig. 1, since their personal
data involve healthcare information, which is categorised as
sensitive.
D. Recording Data Processing Operations
This phase collects and sends a number of useful infor-
mation for verifying GDPR compliance by cloud providers.
The GDPR-manager of the container deploys the container-
log smart contract to send such information to a Blockchain.
The information includes (i) the provider’s address (p), (ii)
processed operations (Ap) on user data, (iii) processed per-
sonal data items (Dp), (iv) collected personal data items from
user (Dcp ), (v) encryption status of operations (Eap ), (vi) the
country name of the provider (locp).
Thereafter, the data operations are recorded by the GDPR-
Agent; the filtering engine is triggered to extract only the
events that meet the GDPR obligations defined by Σ.
Definition 2. Let E be a set of data operations and multi-level
statistics recorded by the GDPR-Agent. The data operations
(EΣ) based on GDPR obligations Σ are filtered using the
filtering function F : E 7→ [0, 1], so that
EΣ =
{
1 : If E ∈ {read, write, transfer}
0 : Otherwise
E. Verifying GDPR Compliance
This phase verifies the operations of cloud providers (data
controllers/processors) executed on personal data in the light of
the GDPR obligations chosen or prioritised by the data subject.
The assumption is that the verifier determines a threshold θσ
for verifying compliance with a specific obligation σ. Such a
threshold is subjective and denotes the interest of the verifier
in checking GDPR compliance.
Definition 3. A preference for checking obligations is a strict
partial order, denoted by P = (Σ, <P), where <P⊆ Σ×Σ. If
σ, σ′ ∈ Σ are two different GDPR obligations, then σ <P σ′
is expressed as “σ′ is preferred rather than σ”.
Given a set of obligations selected by the data subject
and their verification time, the following definition gives the
verifier a priority for detecting violations in accordance with
the preferences of the data subject.
Definition 4. Let σ, σ′ ∈ Σ be two GDPR obligations, θσ
and θσ′ be the thresholds predefined by the verifier, S(σ) and
S(σ′) be the compliance scores determined by the data subject,
so that S(σ) ≥ θσ and S(σ′) ≥ θσ′ . Checking the obligation
σ′ is preferred over checking σ (i.e. σ<P σ′) iff S(σ)<S(σ′).
Algorithm 1 Checking GDPR compliance
1: V ← ∅
2: case data protection
3: V ← V ∪ {p ∈ P | ∃ ap ∈ Ap and Eap = ⊥}
4: case data minimisation
5: V ← V ∪ {p ∈ P | Dcp 6⊆ Dp}
6: case data transfer
7: V ← V ∪ {p ∈ P | ∃ rp ∈ P and locrp /∈ BCR}
8: return V
The verifier deploys the verification contract to report
providers breaching the aforementioned obligations (i.e. data
protection, data minimisation and data transfer). The contract
involves a function presented in Alg. 1 to flag GDPR violators
that are extracted from a set denoted by V .
Data protection case: A provider p from the set of cloud
providers P , executing a set of operations Ap on user data, is
a violator if at least has an operation ap that does not encrypt
personal data.3
Data minimisation case: A provider p is reported as a
violator, if the data items’ set Dp processed by p is a subset
of the data items’ set Dcp requested by p. In other word, a
provider who collects data that is not used for processing is
classified as a violator.4
Data transfer case: A provider p is reported as a violator,
if personal data is transferred to a provider rp such that the
country of rp (denoted by locrp ) is not included in the BCR
set. The set includes the names of non-EU countries having
an adequacy decision with the European Commission, and the
names of groups of undertakings or enterprises which adhere
to duly approved data protection policies to move personal
data internationally over different jurisdictions [6]. Note that
3For the sake of simplicity, we assume that encryption is the only mecha-
nism available for protecting personal data.
4We assume that collected yet not processed data is not necessary for the
purposes determined by the controller which justify the processing of personal
data.
TABLE I
THE TRANSACTION COSTS OF SERVICE PACKAGES
Service pack 1 Service pack 2 Service pack 3
Number of actors 2 4 6
Number of operations 9 16 23
Total container-log (wei) 1562456 2782678 3882146
Data protection (wei) 297628 743436 1401864
Data minimisation (wei) 905648 1582621 2305178
Data transfer (wei) 323501 1112821 1803427
the encryption of the data transfer operation is also checked
through the contract.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
A prototype has been developed via Ropsten [14], which
is a public Blockchain test network. The prototype provided
some details about consumed gas when executing transactions
and the time the mining process takes. Our proposed smart
contracts were implemented on Ethereum [13] using Solid-
ity language. We tried to write our smart contracts with a
minimum gas consumption for each function. The contracts
were compiled by Remix, a browser-based compiler for So-
lidity codes written in Ethereum virtual machine. The smart
contracts GDPR-priority, container-log and verification were
executed in the Ropsten network. The amount of gas consumed
for deploying a contract was 315846 for GDPR-priority,
1146109 for container-log and 1453649 for Verification.
A. Transaction costs
This evaluation calculates the amount of gas consumed in
the execution of our proposed smart contracts. It assumes
that we have three cloud service packages for the pharmacy
scenario represented in Sect. II. Service package 1 includes
online pharmacy and payment providers (actors). Service
package 2 involves online pharmacy, cloud4u, friendface and
real-time binding providers. Service package 3 includes all
the six service providers depicted in Fig 1. The number of
operations executed by the actors on user data is 9, 16 and 23
for service package 1, package 2 and package 3, respectively.
The proposed smart contracts were deployed in the Ropsten
test network and were executed five times to calculate the
average results. We investigated the average cost for recording
information via the container-log contract and the average
costs for verifying compliance with the data protection, data
minimisation and data transfer obligations. Table I shows the
experimental results. As can be seen, when the number of
operations/ actors increases, the amount of gas consumption
increases sharply. In this experiment, the amount of gas used
for recording user preference via the GDPR-priority contract
was 83791 wei.
B. Verification cost vs mining time
This experiment evaluates the verification of compliance
with the data protection, data minimization and data transfer
obligations under different gas prices. It assumes that we
have three cloud service packages, being the same as those
described in Sect. IV-A. The gas price units requested by
TABLE II
THE VERIFICATION COSTS AND AVERAGE MINING TIME
Service pack 1 Service pack 2 Service pack 3
Gas price (gwei) 45 57 70
Data protection ($) 3.12 9.70 23.19
Data minimisation ($) 9.49 20.65 38.13
Data transfer ($) 3.40 14.52 29.83
Mining time (seconds) 257 115 26























Fig. 9. Transaction fee vs Violation detection rate
user are 45, 57 and 70 gwei for running the transactions of
service package 1, package 2 and package 3, respectively. Our
proposed smart contracts were executed five times in Ropsten
to calculate the average results.5 As seen in Table II, the
verification costs are expressed in USD, and the average time
taken for mining such transactions is calculated in seconds.
Given a service package, data protection has the minimum
verification cost, as it only considers the encryption status
of operations and hence its complexity is lesser than other
obligations. In contrast, the most expensive verification cost
is allocated to data minimisation, since not only does it deal
with checking operations, but also examines the personal data
processed by them. The evaluation also showed that, when the
rate of gas price unit increases, there is a considerable decrease
in the average mining time.
C. Evaluation of violation detection rate
This experiment evaluates the relationship between the cost
paid by the patient for verifying GDPR obligations and the
average rate of successful violation detection. It assumes that
the aforementioned service packages are offered to the patient.
We used Ropsten for executing the verification contract and
the rate of gas price is 1 gwei. Per each execution there is a
GDPR violation in a service package selected by the patient.
The violation is randomly selected from amongst the data
5https://ethgasstation.info/
obligation, data minimization and data transfer obligations.
The contract was executed ten times to calculate the average
detection rate. Figure 9 illustrates the results of the experiment,
where the x-axis shows the fee paid by the patient for verifying
compliance with obligations and the y-axis shows the number
of successfully detected violations. As can be seen, for a given
price, the service package 3, involving the highest number of
operations, has the lowest likelihood of violation detection. For
instance, GDPR compliance cannot be detected when patients
select service package 3 and their budget is $0.3.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper presented the design of a container-based ar-
chitecture for the purpose of improving data privacy in cloud
ecosystems. The architecture makes use of Blochchain tech-
nology and supports GDPR obligations in the tracking of
activities executed by cloud providers on user data. By propos-
ing the GDPR-priority, container-log and verification smart
contracts, the paper verified compliance with three GDPR
obligations by cloud providers, namely data protection, data
minimisation and data transfer. The GDPR-priority contract
allows the user to give a preference for verifying compliance
with an obligation. The container-log contract allows the
GDPR-manager within a container to send information rel-
evant to the aforementioned obligations to a Blockchain. The
verification contract enables the verifier to check compliance
with the obligations based on the preferences determined
by the user. These smart contracts were deployed in the
Ropsten test network, and the evaluation results showed that
as the number of operations in a composite service grows, the
verification cost increases significantly.
The architecture proposed in this paper is a promising solu-
tion to facilitate effective compliance with the GDPR, thereby
protecting individuals’ informational privacy and autonomy. In
particular, the tamper-proof nature of the Blockchain ensures
that data controllers have at their disposal a reliable audit
log to verify whether their cloud vendors are processing
their users’ personal data in a lawful manner, in accordance
with their instructions. At the same time, the audit log can
prove invaluable in potential investigations of GDPR vio-
lations conducted by supervisory authorities. Moreover, the
technological solution enables data subjects to verify whether
the cloud-based applications they use are consistent with
their privacy preferences, as well as whether the providers of
those applications live up to the commitments they make in
their privacy policies. Lastly, by enhancing transparency and
accountability, the technological solution aligns cloud-based
architectures with the data protection-by-design and by-default
requirements laid down in the GDPR.
However, a work of caution is in order. There is a significant
operational and conceptual gap between law and technology.
The “ways of working” of each field differ significantly. Data
protection law concepts such as personal data, processing,
consent, purpose limitation and legitimate interests, to name
a few, are overly broad, highly abstract, or involve an intri-
cate substantive assessment. Computer science and software
programming, on the other hand, rely on a concise, binary,
“if/then” type of language that fails to catch legal intricacies.
Additional interdisciplinary research is required to broaden the
set of legal rules the compliance with which can be verify
through smart contracts.
Future work will focus on investigating the performance
of our proposed architecture in a real cloud-based platform.
The translation of more GDPR provisions into smart contracts
remains another potential research avenue for future consider-
ation.
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